

KAPOK # 1232

VIA: AIR POUCH
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Dispatch No. ☐ ☒

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To : Chief, SE
Attn: ☐ ☒
FROM : Senior Representative, ☐ ☒

Date 23 December 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL- BGFIEND/Operational
SPECIFIC- BGFIEND Field Operational Planning for Uprising in Albania

REFERENCE: DIR-27366, Para 5

1. It is believed that before any action can be initiated with a view towards a successful overthrow of the present Albanian regime, that agreements and statements must be made at a diplomatic level between the Jugs, Italians and Greeks as to their position in the event such an uprising should occur. Recent statements by the newly elected Greek Government indicate an increased interest in Balkan and Albanian affairs. It is not at all improbable that any uncoordinated spontaneous outbreak of large scale fighting within Albania would result in an attempt on the part of the Greeks to move into the coveted N. Epirus region ostensibly to maintain order and to protect Greek minorities. It must be assumed that the Jugs would also move into N. Albania at the same time under the guise of maintaining order along their own frontiers. Should this occur, the N.C.F.A. would be rendered powerless as a figurehead around which Albanian forces within and without the country could be rallied in a struggle for freedom and independence. This lead would doubtless fall to the Yugoslav sponsored and backed Prizren League. BGFIEND at present would not be in a sufficiently strong position to control a situation which involved taking the show away from any unilateral move on the part of the Yugoslavs and through paramilitary and P/W efforts convince the Albanian people to rally to the standard of the N.C.F.A. as the one and only national resistance organization. It is felt that following such a line can only result in political confusion and chaos within the country and that any attempted overthrow of the present regime should be carefully worked out beforehand with the Greeks and Yugoslavs. Any coordinated effort on the part of BGFIEND and the Yugoslavs would certainly call for a listing of available assets which could be furnished by both sides. What BGFIEND and N.C.F.A. lack in manpower and strategic locations for spring-boarding a striking force could be made up for by our being in a position to supply and deliver prior to D Day air drops of arms and supplies for some 6000 men to six to eight resistance centers in which BGFIEND operational teams were well established and in Commo contact with their base. Reports from our operational teams indicate that if they were in a position to guarantee an all

out effort of support

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out effort of support to an uprising there would be little difficulty in organizing the local population to participate. From the political side, it is thought that some sort of rapprochement might be worked out between the N.C.F.A. and the Prizren League, perhaps placing them under the leadership of some political figurehead such as King Zog during the period of actual liberation.

2. Presently available assets:

a. Teams

Fig Team to organize Pogradec area

Willow Team to organize Korca

Apple Team in the Martenesh area must be considered as lost due to the length of time taken to reach an agreement between the field and Headquarters to send them aid.

One RNCASTING Team - Skoder area

One RNCASTING Team - Merdite-Mati area

One RNCASTING Team - Valona area

One RNCASTING Team - Gjinckaster/Permat area

One RNPOTLOG Team - Elbasan area

Each of the above teams would be furnished at least one W/T operator.

b. Equipment and Supplies:

Small arms and automatic weapons for 6,000 men to be available from N. Africa, where it will shortly be moved from Athens.

5,000 cases 5 in 1 G.I. sterile rations available Athens (80 tons).

c. Logistical Support:

Air

ARC Wing for airlifting men, arms and supplies from N. Africa to Athens for combat drop loading aboard covert aircraft

1 - Covert C-47

1 - Covert C-54

2 - Covert B-26's

Maritime

None available here.

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No Team
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d. Communications:

10 - 12 trained W/T operators by June '53 to establish communications channels between resistance centers headquarters and base.

e. Training:

Construction starts January 1953 on island site for training additional teams for 1953 operations. This site, comprising of four islands, could be used in addition as a base for maritime operations and could easily accommodate a large body of men.

3. Our operational plans call for the establishment of teams and resistance centers by August 1953 in the following areas.

- a. Skoder
- b. Merdite/Mati
- c. Martenesh (if Apple has survived)
- d. Elbasan
- e. Valona
- f. Pogradec
- g. Korca
- h. Gjinokaster/Permet

Infiltration would be by land and by sea (if facilities are available to us). In the event no sea infiltration facilities are available, air drop will be used for Skoder and Valona. However, we are very much against using blind air drops for team infiltration.

Our existing contacts would enable us to organize at present the Kukes, Martenesh (depending on the fate of Apple), Pogradec and Korca areas. The remaining areas as listed above would depend upon the success of the 1953 teams scheduled for these areas.

Past experience with the N.C.F.A. Committee members leads us to believe they would be more of a nuisance than help in any paramilitary operation. However, it would be advisable to infiltrate some of their more able and courageous lieutenants by air drop perhaps 20 days prior to the armed uprising. The same would hold true for Zog's emissaries.

In recent conversations with Rivett, he stated that there was a very good possibility of Zog acquiring a large tract of land in Tripoli which he would to all purposes turn into an agricultural project employing Albanian

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refugees. They would be organized and directed by his former army officers. It is hoped that perhaps some 125 members of the guard company could be recruited for this project under Zog's auspices and transported by S & W airlines from Germany with Zog being the charterer of the plane for cover purposes. If such a holding area could be set up, it would be possible to draw men from here and train and equip them as air borne reinforcements and for certain commando type missions..

It is felt that very little can be gained from an operational point of view in working closely with the British in the planning and carrying out of such a mission. They have had no successes with their Scrutiny, Satisfaction and Saluki Teams this year and have nothing to offer from here in the way of supplies or covert A/C. In the event they do succeed in establishing teams in 1953, we could at a later date coordinate our plans with them for their mission when the time for revolt was imminent. Supplies for any resistance areas which the British might establish would undoubtedly be requested from us, judging from our experience with them here.

As stated above, any plan for an armed revolt in Albania should be coordinated with the Greeks, if our policy is to deny them the excuse for moving into the disputed Northern Epirus on the outbreak of a revolution.

We estimate that eight to nine months would be necessary for the full employment of the BGFIEND assets.

1st Phase - Recruiting, training, infiltration of 8 teams to be completed by mid-June 1953.

Movement arms and rations to North Africa where they will be packed and ready for air dispatch by 1 July 1953.

Gradual step-up of P/W operations.

Movement of recruits to Zog's agricultural project in North Africa. If impossible to give them paramilitary training here, it will be necessary to move them to BGFIEND's proposed island site, complete their training and air drop them into Albania on the outbreak of the revolt. These men should be readied by mid-August 1953 and standing by for dispatch by both air drop and sea infiltration.

2nd Phase - June - mid-August 1953

Organization of resistance centers by our operational teams for D Day.

Gradual build up of arms caches within the country.

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Increase P/W

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Increase P/W operations

Issuing final operational orders to teams.

Coordination of final plans with Jugoslavs on basis of their Albanian refugee striking forces moving across frontier to join forces with resistance areas as established by our teams. Control of Tirana would be primary objective.

3rd Phase - Mid-August - Mid-September

Armed revolt

Air drop of coup de main and commando groups

Air resupply mission to resistance centers.

Full scale P/W effort

Zog enters Tirana on his white mule! and exit BGFIEND.

4. The BGFIEND field station requests Headquarters views on the present Albanian situation together with instructions as to what line you wish us to follow in our 1953 operational planning other than the infiltration of teams and the continuation of our P/W efforts and the usual N.C.F.A. activities.

WFH/RPB/lgk

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